Titel

Merkliste
1 Ergebnisse

Social Security, Majority-Voting Equilibrium and Dynamic Ef..:

Hu, Sheng Cheng
International Economic Review. 23 (1982) 2 - p. 269-287 , 1982

Link: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2526437

RT Journal
T1 <Title>Social Security, Majority-Voting Equilibrium and Dynamic Efficiency</Title>

UL https://suche.suub.uni-bremen.de/peid=jstor-2526437&Exemplar=1&LAN=DE
				
A1 Hu, Sheng Cheng
PB The Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania, and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association
YR 1982
SN 0020-6598
SN 1468-2354
K1 Political science
K1 Government
K1 Governance
K1 Taxation
K1 Taxes
K1 Income taxes
K1 Federal taxes
K1 Social security tax
K1 Taxation theories
K1 Optimal taxation
K1 Politics
K1 Political processes
K1 Political elections
K1 Voting
K1 Economics
K1 Economic disciplines
K1 Financial economics
K1 Finance
K1 Financial instruments
K1 Financial securities
K1 Margined securities
K1 Macroeconomics
K1 Aggregate economy
K1 Market economics
K1 Market equilibrium
K1 Equilibrium interest rate
K1 Tax benefits
K1 Economic policy
K1 Public finance
K1 Public expenditures
K1 Entitlement programs
K1 Social Security benefits
K1 Long run equilibrium
K1 Consumption taxes
JF International Economic Review
VO 23
IS 2
SP 269
OP 287
LK http://dx.doi.org/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2526437
DO https://www.jstor.org/stable/2526437
SF ELIB - SuUB Bremen

Export

RefWorks (nur Desktop-Version!)
Flow (Zuerst in Flow einloggen, dann importieren)