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Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Corr..:

Compte, Olivier ; Jehiel, Philippe
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 1 (2009) 1 - p. 182-206 , 2009

Link: https://www.jstor.org/stable/25760352

RT Journal
T1 <Title>Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types</Title>

UL https://suche.suub.uni-bremen.de/peid=jstor-25760352&Exemplar=1&LAN=DE
				
A1 Compte, Olivier
A1 Jehiel, Philippe
PB American Economic Association
YR 2009
SN 1945-7669
SN 1945-7685
K1 Economics
K1 Economic policy
K1 Public finance
K1 Subsidies
K1 Mathematics
K1 Applied mathematics
K1 Game theory
K1 Mechanism design
K1 Behavioral sciences
K1 Sociology
K1 Human societies
K1 Social welfare
K1 Public goods
K1 Microeconomics
K1 Macroeconomics
K1 Aggregate economy
K1 Supply and demand
K1 Supply
K1 Surplus
K1 Applied sciences
K1 Research methods
K1 Observational research
K1 Participant observation
K1 Business
K1 Business operations
K1 Commerce
K1 Trade
K1 Law
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K1 Legal ethics
K1 Legal responsibilities
K1 Legal liability
K1 Limited liability
K1 Physical sciences
K1 Earth sciences
K1 Geology
K1 Mineralogy
K1 Minerals
K1 Gem stones
JF American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
VO 1
IS 1
SP 182
OP 206
LK http://dx.doi.org/https://www.jstor.org/stable/25760352
DO https://www.jstor.org/stable/25760352
SF ELIB - SuUB Bremen

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