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1 Ergebnisse
1
Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval ba..:
Laslier, Jean-François
;
Van der Straeten, Karine
Social Choice and Welfare. 47 (2016) 3 - p. 559-587 , 2016
Link:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/26153475
RT Journal T1
Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates
UL https://suche.suub.uni-bremen.de/peid=jstor-26153475&Exemplar=1&LAN=DE A1 Laslier, Jean-François A1 Van der Straeten, Karine PB Springer YR 2016 SN 0176-1714 SN 1432-217X K1 Political science K1 Politics K1 Political processes K1 Political elections K1 Voting K1 Economics K1 Economic disciplines K1 Labor economics K1 Employment K1 Occupations K1 Politicians K1 Political candidates K1 Public economics K1 Public choice economics K1 Voting paradox K1 Ballots K1 Plurality voting K1 Cumulative voting K1 Voting behavior K1 Mathematics K1 Applied mathematics K1 Game theory K1 Nash equilibrium K1 Government K1 Political systems K1 Political regimes K1 Democracy K1 Representative democracy K1 Electorate K1 Voter preferences JF Social Choice and Welfare VO 47 IS 3 SP 559 OP 587 LK http://www.jstor.org/stable/26153475 DO http://www.jstor.org/stable/26153475 SF ELIB - SuUB Bremen
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